紧急!WordPress文件管理器(file manager)插件爆严重0day漏洞
本文首发于安全客 Wordpress File-manager 任意文件上传漏洞分析
0x01 漏洞分析
分析环境:
- wordpress 5.5.1
- file manager 6.0
- win10 phpstudy php 7.0.9
漏洞点位于file manager的connector.minimal.php文件,具体路径在wordpress\wp-content\plugins\wp-file-manager\lib\php\connector.minimal.php

首先实例化一个elFinderConnector对象,然后调用它的run()方法,跟进run();
wp-content/plugins/wp-file-manager/lib/php/elFinderConnector.class.php

如果HTTP请求的方法是POST会把POST和GET请求的保存到$src,然后判断POST传的参数。如果不传入targets,就不会进入前几个判断,之后会把POST传的cmd变量赋给$cmd,然后调用commandExists()检测传入的$cmd是否存在。
然后利用commandArgsList()函数获取$cmd对应的命令参数列表,漏洞利用需要上传文件,这里只关注$cmd为upload的情况。
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| public function commandArgsList($cmd) { if ($this->commandExists($cmd)) { $list = $this->commands[$cmd]; $list['reqid'] = false; } else { $list = array(); } return $list; }
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循环遍历,将POST传入的参数保存到$args数组中,然后调用input_filter()函数对$args进行简单的过滤,
替换掉%00,并且做stripslashes()处理。然后将通过表单上传的文件$_FILES存到$args['FILE']中。然后调用exec()函数,跟进
wp-content/plugins/wp-file-manager/lib/php/elFinder.class.php

前面会进行一些判断,最后进入到$this->$cmd($args)调用upload()函数,跟进

首先将POST传入的target赋给$target变量,然后调用volume()函数,

可以看到$this->volume数组含有两项,一项是l1_,一项是t1_,volume()函数定义如果传入的$hash以l1_或t1_开头,返回$this->volume数组对应的值,否则返回false。在upload函数中会检测$volume,如果其为false,程序会报错结束,所以POST传入的target必须以它们两个为前缀。继续分析upload()函数。依次取出$args数组中的值赋给相应的变量,这里要求$args['FILES']['upload']也就是$_FILES['upload']为数组,才能将其赋给$files变量,这就需要上传文件时上传一个文件数组。接下来其他的如html、upload_path、chunk、cid、mtime等参数可以不传。接下来遍历$files['name']也就是$_FILES['upload']['name'],如果文件上传成功,将$_FILES['upload']['name']赋给$tmpname,然后调用fopen()打开上传的临时文件,将指针保存在$fp。在不传如upload_path时$thash等于$target,所以$_target为$target为我们POST传入的target变量。之后调用了$volume->upload()函数,第一个参数为之前打开文件的指针,第二个参数为POST传入的target变量,第三个参数为上传的文件名,第四个参数为空的数组。跟进elFinderVolumeDriver的upload()
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| public function upload($fp, $dst, $name, $tmpname, $hashes = array()) { if ($this->commandDisabled('upload')) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_PERM_DENIED); }
if (($dir = $this->dir($dst)) == false) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_TRGDIR_NOT_FOUND, '#' . $dst); }
if (empty($dir['write'])) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_PERM_DENIED); }
if (!$this->nameAccepted($name, false)) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_INVALID_NAME); }
$mimeByName = ''; if ($this->mimeDetect === 'internal') { $mime = $this->mimetype($tmpname, $name); } else { $mime = $this->mimetype($tmpname, $name); $mimeByName = $this->mimetype($name, true); if ($mime === 'unknown') { $mime = $mimeByName; } }
if (!$this->allowPutMime($mime) || ($mimeByName && !$this->allowPutMime($mimeByName))) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_UPLOAD_FILE_MIME, '(' . $mime . ')'); }
$tmpsize = (int)sprintf('%u', filesize($tmpname)); if ($this->uploadMaxSize > 0 && $tmpsize > $this->uploadMaxSize) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_UPLOAD_FILE_SIZE); }
$dstpath = $this->decode($dst); if (isset($hashes[$name])) { $test = $this->decode($hashes[$name]); $file = $this->stat($test); } else { $test = $this->joinPathCE($dstpath, $name); $file = $this->isNameExists($test); }
$this->clearcache();
if ($file && $file['name'] === $name) { if ($this->uploadOverwrite) { if (!$file['write']) { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_PERM_DENIED); } elseif ($file['mime'] == 'directory') { return $this->setError(elFinder::ERROR_NOT_REPLACE, $name); } $this->remove($test); } else { $name = $this->uniqueName($dstpath, $name, '-', false); } }
$stat = array( 'mime' => $mime, 'width' => 0, 'height' => 0, 'size' => $tmpsize);
if (strpos($mime, 'image') === 0 && ($s = getimagesize($tmpname))) { $stat['width'] = $s[0]; $stat['height'] = $s[1]; } if (($path = $this->saveCE($fp, $dstpath, $name, $stat)) == false) { return false; }
$stat = $this->stat($path); if (empty($stat['url']) && ($url = $this->getContentUrl($stat['hash']))) { $stat['url'] = $url; }
return $stat; }
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首先进入commandDisabled()函数,返回false。
然后进入dir()函数,参数为$dst即POST传入的target值。

调用了file函数,

跟进decode()函数

decode()函数首先判断是否以$this->id开头,然后截取出l1_后面的内容,之后进行base64解密,uncrypt函数如上,未作操作。然后更换分隔符,之后调用abspathCE()函数,从注释中可以看出,abspathCE()函数会先判断$path是否等于分隔符\,如果等于,返回$this->root,否则返回$this->root拼接$path。看下对应的abspathCE()函数。



ps:POST传入target前缀不同的区别
- 前缀为
l1_时,$this->root 为C:\Users\admin\phpstudy_pro\WWW\wordpress\wp-content\plugins\wp-file-manager\lib\files

- 前缀为
t1_时,$this->disabled[]包含upload,程序会报错结束,$this->root 为C:\Users\admin\phpstudy_pro\WWW\wordpress\wp-content\plugins\wp-file-manager\lib\files\.trash

继续分析程序流程,decode()函数会返回C:\Users\admin\phpstudy_pro\WWW\wordpress\wp-content\plugins\wp-file-manager\lib\files,然后调用stat()函数。


返回的$ret为
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| Array ( [isowner] => [ts] => 1589423646 [mime] => directory [read] => 1 [write] => 1 [size] => 0 [hash] => l1_Lw [name] => files [rootRev] => [options] => Array ( [path] => [url] => /wordpress/wp-content/plugins/wp-file-manager/lib/php/../files/ [tmbUrl] => /wordpress/wp-content/plugins/wp-file-manager/lib/php/../files/.tmb/ [disabled] => Array ( [0] => chmod )
[separator] => \ [copyOverwrite] => 1 [uploadOverwrite] => 1 [uploadMaxSize] => 9223372036854775807 [uploadMaxConn] => 3 [uploadMime] => Array ( [firstOrder] => deny [allow] => Array ( [0] => all )
[deny] => Array ( [0] => all )
)
[dispInlineRegex] => ^(?:(?:video|audio)|image/(?!.+\+xml)|application/(?:ogg|x-mpegURL|dash\+xml)|(?:text/plain|application/pdf)$) [jpgQuality] => 100 [archivers] => Array ( [create] => Array ( [0] => application/x-tar [1] => application/zip )
[extract] => Array ( [0] => application/x-tar [1] => application/zip )
[createext] => Array ( [application/x-tar] => tar [application/zip] => zip )
)
[uiCmdMap] => Array ( )
[syncChkAsTs] => 1 [syncMinMs] => 10000 [i18nFolderName] => 0 [tmbCrop] => 1 [tmbReqCustomData] => [substituteImg] => 1 [onetimeUrl] => 1 [trashHash] => t1_Lw [csscls] => elfinder-navbar-root-local )
[volumeid] => l1_ [locked] => 1 [isroot] => 1 [phash] => )
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返回dir()函数,然后在返回到upload()函数,将返回值赋给upload()函数中的$dir变量,

然后进行mime的判断,程序识别上传的php脚本的mime为text/x-php,跟进allowPutMime()函数,

从程序自带的注释中可以看出如果uploadOrder数组为array('deny','allow'),则默认时允许上传的mime。然后获取文件的大小,若文件大小不合法报错结束程序,之后decode()处理$dst(POST传入的target值)赋给$dstpath,因为$hash为空数组,所以会调用joinPathCE()将$dstpath和$name(上传文件的文件名)拼接,然后检查文件是否存在。

最后调用$this->saveCE()

跟进_save()。

本地时利用Windows系统分析,$path为C:\Users\admin\phpstudy_pro\WWW\wordpress\wp-content\plugins\wp-file-manager\lib\files\shell.php;$uri为C:\Windows\phpxxxx.tmp,最后会调用copy()将上传的文件复制到\wordpress\wp-content\plugins\wp-file-manager\lib\files\shell.php,即完成了任意文件上传。
0x02 漏洞利用
利用burp发包

访问http://192.168.43.44/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/wp-file-manager/lib/files/shell.php

0x03 漏洞修复
影响范围
file manager 6.0至6.8
官方修复删除了connector.minimal.php和connector.minimal.php-dist文件。

增加了.htaccess。

参考:
紧急!WordPress文件管理器插件爆严重0day漏洞